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Some believe that genetics threatens privacy and autonomy and will eviscerate the concept of human nature.
Despite the astonishing research advances, however,
none of these dire predictions and no radical transformation of the law have occurred. Advocates have tried to
use genetic evidence to affect judgments of criminal
responsibility. At present, however genetic research
can provide little aid to assessments of criminal responsibility and it does not suggest a radical critique of
responsibility.

Internal and external interdisciplinary critiques
Another discipline could influence the law by providing
either an internal or an external critique. In the former, the
general validity of a legal doctrine, practice or institution is
accepted but the other discipline tries either to explain the
legal phenomenon or to reform it. For example, findings
from other disciplines might suggest that the doctrines of
criminal responsibility should be altered in various ways
but might not suggest that the concept of responsibility is
incoherent. By contrast, an external critique suggests that
the doctrine, practice or institution is invalid. Many people
believe that discoveries in genetics and other sciences
strongly suggest the truth of determinism (or something
like it), and that if determinism is true, then no one can be
genuinely responsible. For example, The Economist recently warned, ‘Genetics may yet threaten privacy, kill autonomy, make society homogeneous and gut the concept of
human nature. But neuroscience could do all of these
things first’ [1]. Blaming and punishing criminals is thus
allegedly unfair because no one deserves such treatment
[2]. The conclusion is that current conceptions of criminal
justice should be abandoned because they rest on a morally
mistaken foundation. External critiques are radical,
whereas internal critiques produce incremental change
or suggest that the current system is valid.
The law’s psychology and general concept of
responsibility
To understand how genetics research can influence criminal
law requires understanding of the law’s implicit psychology
and concept of responsibility. Law is a system of rules and
standards that is meant to guide human action by providing
agents with reasons to act one way or another [3]. Criminal
law, and indeed all law, therefore presupposes the ‘folk
psychological’ view, which causally explains behavior in
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part by mental states such as desires, beliefs, intentions,
volitions, and plans [4]. Other psychological, as well as
biological and sociological variables also play a role but folk
psychology considers mental states fundamental to a complete explanation of human action. The law’s concept of
responsibility follows from the nature of law and the type
of creature it addresses. Responsible agents are those who
can be adequately guided by the law, which means, roughly,
that only conscious, intentional and rational creatures with
developed linguistic capacity can be responsible. This
explains why young children and some people with mental
abnormalities are not considered responsible [5].
Criminal law responsibility criteria
Now let us be a bit more specific about the criteria for
criminal liability, which are normative and not scientific
facts. These criteria justify state blame and punishment
because offenders who meet them deserve such treatment,
and desert is at least a necessary condition for just punishment in the USA.
The definitions of most criminal prohibitions include an
intentional action done in a reasonably integrated state of
consciousness that is accompanied by another mental state
(mens rea) that indicates how culpable the action is. Note
that these are both folk psychological criteria. For example,
a common definition of murder is intentional killing conduct done with the purpose to kill. A neuromuscular spasm
that causes the death of another is not an action, and if one
is driving intentionally but completely carefully, then an
entirely accidental killing of a pedestrian would not be
done with the purpose to cause death. In both cases, the
defendant is not culpable.
Even if the agent does the prohibited act with the
culpable mental state, the person will not be liable if he
or she has an ‘affirmative defense’ because either the
agent’s act was right or permissible under the circumstances (a justification) or the person was not a responsible
agent at the time of the crime (an excuse). Intentionally
killing a wrongful aggressor because the agent reasonably
believes he must do so to save his own life, self-defense, is
an example of the former. If the agent kills because he has
the delusional belief that he is in deadly danger, then he
has done wrong, but he might be excused by the defense of
legal insanity because he was not a rational agent.
There are two generic excusing conditions: lack of rational capacity and compulsion. The latter can be caused
externally, such as cases involving dreadful ‘do-it-or-else’
threats (e.g. ‘kill or I will kill you’), or internally, such as
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cases of strong internal desires (e.g. an addict’s desire to
seek and use substances). In both cases, the agent acted
intentionally but we might think it is unfair to ask him to
control himself because it will be so difficult to do so. Note
that affirmative defenses also involve folk psychology because they are based on mental states, including desires
and beliefs.
Translating genetic research for assessing criminal
responsibility
Genetics concerns mechanistic causation. Genes do not
have mental states and do not commit crimes; people do.
To make a useful internal contribution to criminal responsibility, the genetic data must be ‘translated’ into the law’s
folk psychological responsibility criteria [6]. It must be
shown how, precisely, the genetic data are relevant to
whether a defendant acted, whether he or she possessed
a particular mens rea, and whether the mental states
relevant to defenses were present.
It is not sufficient to indicate that genetics played a causal
role in explaining the criminal behavior, even if that causal
role is very powerful. Causation and predictability are not
excusing conditions in law and causation is not the equivalent of legal compulsion (most action is not the causal result
of dire threats or uncontrollable desires) [7]. If they were, no
one would be responsible because we inhabit a causal universe, but we nonetheless hold people responsible. A genetic
predisposition to criminal conduct does not per se mitigate or
excuse. Causation is relevant only if it tends to show the
presence of a genuine excusing condition, but it is the latter
that does the legal work. Believing that causation per se
mitigates or excuses responsibility is the most pernicious
confusion bedeviling the attempt to relate scientific findings
to criminal responsibility. I have termed it the ‘fundamental
psycholegal error’ [8]. In the few legal cases in which genetic
information has been used to mitigate responsibility, this
error has been common [9,10].
We are reasonably confident that having a genetically
induced MAO-A deficiency in interaction with childhood
abuse causally increases the risk of criminal and antisocial
behavior more than ninefold [11]. Nonetheless, there is no
reason to believe that offenders exposed to that interaction
did not act or form the required mental states. If exposure
to that interaction somehow diminished their rationality
or produced some type of uncontrollable internal desire,
then mitigation or excuse might be warranted. Such a
diminished rationality or control problem would have to
be demonstrated independently by evidence other than
causation data.
Internal contributions unrelated to responsibility
Genetic research might contribute internally to criminal
law in ways unrelated to responsibility. For example,
knowledge about genetic variables that predispose people
to crime could enhance the accuracy of dangerousness
predictions that affect sentencing and parole and it might
enhance the efficacy of interventions to reduce the risk of
crime. Note that if it were safe to release an offender early
as a result of a successful, genetically based intervention,
the reason would be public safety and cost and not because
the offender deserved less punishment.
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External challenges to the concept of responsibility
Genetic research might also provide a radical external
critique of criminal responsibility if it convincingly demonstrated that no one deserves punishment. It might do
this either by lending support to a deterministic metaphysics, or by proving that our mental states play no role
in explaining our behavior. The former is simply the
familiar determinism and free will issue. Note that contra-causal libertarian free will is not an internal criterion
in law and is not even foundational for criminal responsibility. For example, even if determinism is true, some
defendants are delusional and most are not. Some offenders act with a gun at their heads but most do not. These
are differences that make a moral difference according to
theories of fairness we endorse. At the metaphysical
level, there is a respectable view, ‘compatibilism,’ which
holds that robust responsibility is possible in a deterministic world even if we lack libertarian free will [12].
Determinist ‘incompatibilists’ disagree, of course, but
the dispute is not resolvable and the law cannot wait
for the metaphysicians. Thus, the external critique based
on determinism does not have much legal purchase,
although it has proponents.
Compatibilism cannot save responsibility from the second external critique because compatibilism presupposes
the folk-psychological view of agency that the second critique denies. Some believe that mental states play no
causal role – paradoxically, this is a motivating mental
state for them – but neither genetics nor any other science
at present remotely proves that our mental states are
causally inert [6]. As the eminent philosopher of mind,
Jerry Fodor, has written, if we are wrong about the importance of mental states, that will be about the ‘wrongest’ we
have ever been about anything [13]. Finally, if our mental
states, including our reasons for action, are simply an
epiphenomenal sideshow the brain somehow constructs,
what good reason would we have to do anything? The task
of genetics and other sciences should be to explain our
intentionality rather than reductively to explain it away.
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